Monday, April 8, 2013

Are Hedge Funds Too Big to Outperform?

Given that hedge fund assets are 8-10% as large as mutual fund assets, is the asset class too big to outperform? 

Soros's argument is that given the prevalence and power of hedge funds as an asset class, they cannot outperform. It is almost a tautology that not everyone outperform the market, but has this alternative asset class reached such a stage? The hedge fund tendency to lag equity markets are a recent phenomenon and to be fair, is a not exactly a fair comparison. After all, if alternative investments are meant to be less correlated with the market, doesn't that by definition include the possibility of under-performance?

Nonetheless, there is no shortage of studies showing how smaller managers outperform larger ones. Moreover, asset growth often goes to the larger, established ones and ones with the most best marketing/sales force. Perhaps the best example is this article about changes in the industry, quote below:
[Hedge Funds] need to excel in three areas which include: having a high quality product offering, a marketing message that clearly and concisely articulates their differential advantage across all the evaluation factors investors use to select hedge funds, and finally, a best-in-breed sales strategy. This sales strategy can be achieved by either building out an internal sales team, leveraging a leading third party marketing firm, or a combination of both. Firms that do not excel in each of these three areas will have a difficult time raising assets.
Compare this quote with this article from nymag from a few years ago:
It doesn’t take much. To run money, which is how managers refer to what they do, requires little more than a few computers. Zach’s boss likes to say, “I could run $100 million by myself.” The theory is that they’ve got an almost athletic gift for investing. They’re the type who can, as one manager did, call the direction of the market correctly 22 days in a row. They don’t want (or need) the kind of marketing, sales, and investor-relations apparatus that comes with, say, a mutual fund.
Now, the latter is of course hyperbole, but to me the intent is clear. The core of managing money to outperform is to focus on investing/trading, not top-notch third party providers, sales/marketing etc.

In short, the alternatives industry is not so alternative anymore, and in my opinion the institutionalization of the industry is exactly how most (and in aggregate) won't outperform.

*Funny doc I came across while researching marketing docs: this looks like a well-put together marketing presentation, and they have pwc as auditor + citco as fund admin, both large, well-known providers. Unfortunately, they had a sad ending.



6 comments:

  1. I definitely believe that the large funds deliver the outsized returns of smaller firms. Look at Warren Buffett's latest letter to shareholders in which he states that Berkshire (although not technically a hedge fund but bear with me for the sake of argument) has underperformed the S&P 4 out of the last 5 years. They are so big that hardly any deal for them moves the needle.

    I completely agree with your statement in the last paragraph. Look at all the Tiger Cub funds, most of them have extremely similar holdings. Strategies that were unique 5-10 years ago are now being piggybacked which makes everything more correlated.

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    1. Thank you for commenting! Totally agree with your Buffett reference and it does seem to be a intrinsic problem with fund management. After a certain point, depending on strategy, any truly talented manager has to decide between asset growth vs. returns. Very few do the former, it seems.

      Even for talented managers, not so easy to find balancing point. Einhorn shorted Leh to essentially zero but still lost 17% in 2008. One only wonders if he would have even had a negative year if managing 1/10 the capital, i.e. less than 1 billion.

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    2. I am a big believer that everything is driven by incentives. When you're managing a 5 Billion dollar fund, you're getting 100 million in management fees if you're charging 2 percent. Then you've got the UES apartment, the Hamptons house, and the J-Hole chalet and you've got pretty high expenses. The incentive isn't then to produce returns but rather to grow the fund and lock in your income stream via management fees.

      You're exactly right. As Greenlight, or any fund, sees their capital base grow they have to produce more ideas in which to invest in. If you've got 500mm, you can pretty much concentrate your bets in your best ideas. At higher levels you may have to put money behind ideas that you don't necessarily have as much conviction in because most investors don't want to see a fund hold a large portion of their assets in cash, especially in this era of ZIRP.

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  2. I would agree PinkPolo shorts, I went to an investment meeting the other day of a small German value fund, and he very much echoed this post. Most money is made when you undertake an investment against the general consensus ahead of time, the bigger the institution the greater the disincentive to undertake this kind of activity and the more difficult it becomes. Investing against the crowd may be something shareholders may not be comfortable with, and I would imagine few shareholders at the biggest asset managers willing to wait more than 2 years for the market price to meet a stocks intrinsic value. Success is a double edged sword it seems.

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    1. Indeed - I wasn't around for the dot-com bubble, but if I recall for institutions the only thing worse than losing money along with the crowd is underperforming when markets rallying and others doing well (like now?).

      On the other hand, would think there is there a difference between merely underperforming (while still making money), vs having a (large) down year when going contrarian? Would think part of a money manager's job is both to make these long-term contrarian investments, but also manage the (portfolio) risk.

      An example of a contrarian now be Hussman's Strategic Growth fund? (https://www.google.com/finance?q=MUTF:HSGFX). He is a bear on the world equity market and has chosen to hedge via written call options. Not only has he underperformed, he has lost money (-17% in 2012 alone) as his hedges overwhelm his long positions.

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    2. Thanks for the link!
      Once again great information

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